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Abstract
Both analysts and strategists have a tendency to categorize various security threats in rather neat 
categories.  In many – likely most – cases these categories simply do not fit well for areas where there is 
significant internal insecurity.  This particularly is the case for groups that can be called hybrids or shape 
shifters.  Armed groups have an unfortunate tendency to shift both their form and significance to security 
operations.  All too often, planners and intelligence analysts are unable to adequately track the changes 
among what are viewed as peripheral groups, and the significance of these changes.  Military strategy 
normally is focused on insurgents or terrorists, with some peripheral attention to militias or other armed 
groups.  Trying to unpack the significance and operations of other, non-included groups can be very 
difficult.  A broader form of environmental sensing – to include how intervention forces may serve as yet 
another actor for analysis – is critical in understanding how to achieve operational success.
As Western forces increasingly have become involved in various interventions in countries facing internal 
conflicts -- or in some cases, creating internal conflicts -- much more attention has been paid to complex 
security environments.  A number of scholars and analysts have devoted considerable attention to 
developing a typology of armed actors similar to terrorists, insurgents, warlords/militias, organized crime, 
and other groups.  The purpose of this paper is not to pick through all the definitions, particularly 
distinctions between terrorism and insurgency, which can become a sterile exercise.  Instead, the focus is 
on whether such fixed types are dangerous analytically in developing strategy. 
There are several issues that are important.   First, most military strategy is focused on insurgents or 
terrorists, with some peripheral attention to militias or other armed groups.  Trying to unpack the 
significance and operations of other, non-included groups can be very difficult.  Second, the importance of 
other groups is very dependent on the overall security environment, and they can be both agents and the 
result of this environment.  Finally, most of these movements exist and in some cases thrive in societies in 
which multiple stressors exist.   
The ‘others’ can be used as a catch-all category, but such groups can be critical for internal security.  (For 
a similar approach, although more focused on militias and criminal groups, see Steven Metz’ 
Rethinking Insurgencies) They can emerge (and at times recede) quickly as security threats.  Many of 
these groups tend to be at best secondary targets for analysis and commonly more difficult to predict.  If 
ideologies exist, they may be incomprehensible to outsiders.  They are more likely to emerge in already 
stressed environments, and the salience of particular identities can shift with environmental shifts.  Two 
types of groups have particular salience.  Loosely described, they are hybrids and shape shifters.
Hybrid Groups
Hybrid groups are those which show aspects of combining the basic characteristics of differing kinds of 
groups.  Most commonly, they might be viewed as organized criminal groups that also develop political or 
ideological aspirations or ‘political’ groups whose level of criminality is such that they appear to be more 
interested in profit than politics.  The former organizations – at times rather loosely organized – typically 
have been treated as common gangs until their political importance is recognized, albeit frequently rather 
late.  Their movement into political violence usually has caught analysts and governments by surprise.  
Three good examples are provided by the Jamaat al Muslimeen (Organization [or Group] of Muslims) in 
Trinidad and Tobago, D Company in India, and the Jamaican gangs referred to as posses.
The Shape Shifters
Clearly, groups can change over time.  These changes can involve membership, goals, and at times types.  
A key question for governments and analysts is once groups are labeled, how well can security services 
shift as groups morph?  At best, there likely will be a lag as analysts acquire information on violent 
groups.  At worst, viewing groups as static entities can lead to ineffective or perhaps counterproductive 
strategies in responding to internal threats.
There are other issues in group transitions.  Elements within groups can change at different paces.  For 
example, it appears that different Frentes (Fronts) within the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) have developed different levels of interest in politics versus the narcotics trade (discussions with 
Colombian military officers, Bogota, Colombia, June 2011). The mix of political versus commercial 
interests almost certainly will complicate efforts to deal with the group.  More generally, this is 
exacerbated by multiple motives of the members of armed groups.
Uncertainty and Labeling
In general, this leads to the question of whether a political version of the Heisenberg Principle applies.  In 
physics, the basics of the Heisenberg Principle are that the more precisely the position of a particle is 
determined, the less precisely the momentum is known in this instant, and vice versa; and that the 
measurement of position necessarily disturbs a particle's momentum, and vice versa.  In terms of internal 
security, do governments really know what they are looking at?  Typically, in the intelligence and 
analytical worlds, more attention is paid to groups at particular points in time:  the nature of intelligence 
collection most often involves a series of snapshots.  Although these snapshots if collected and analyzed 
over time with emphasis on changes observed can provide valuable clues as to shifts in groups’ behaviors 
and structures, it is much more common for labels to ‘stick’ to particular groups, with changes being 
viewed as shifts from pre-existing norms.  It can require considerable flexibility for analysts to completely 
re-cast their mental constructs of violent groups that might be undergoing major changes in type.  
There also are practical aspects to this issue.  For example, police services inherently focus on criminal 
groups.  Both through pre-existing mindsets and through bureaucratic imperatives, police intelligence 
analysts almost certainly will be pre-disposed to label most illegal violent groups as criminal, minimizing 
possible shifts to increased political activities.  Conversely, ministries of interior and militaries are more 
likely to focus on political and internal security, with a concomitant emphasis on ‘insurgent’ groups.  As 
groups shift their forms of identity, there almost always will be a lag time – and, seemingly at times, a 
complete failure – in agencies’ recognition of this.
The second related question with this issue is what impact does government labeling have on the 
behaviors of armed groups?  This issue is much more amorphous, but may play a role in groups’ 
operations.  Arguably, groups may shift their activities in response to government labels.  For instance, 
criminal groups may increase their social support and political activities in response to a label of 
“organized crime” in an effort to increase their legitimacy.  This certainly has been the situation in the 
case of the Jamaican posses, which have developed at least de facto links with Jamaican political parties.  
Likewise, in Mexico, some of the drug gangs appear to have increased their social services in certain 
areas.  These types of activities can change the perceptions of the populace they serve, even as 
governments or external supporting forces continue to view the groups as solely criminal.  Conversely, 
insurgent groups that become increasingly involved in organized crime – such as the Colombian FARC – 
may lose popular support even as a government continues to base its strategy on traditional 
counterinsurgency strategies.    
Two other issues also must be factored into strategic and operational analysis.  The first is what David 
Kilcullen calls the “accidental guerrilla” for whom insurgency is more a matter of circumstance than a 
deep ideological support for a cause. Also, in practice, there might also be marked differences between 
formal ideologies – or a lack of such ideologies – versus realities on the ground.  Groups can adopt (and 
have adopted) any number of varying ideologies that would seem to support mobilization and recruitment 
for their particular goals, but this does not necessarily mean some form of pure adherence to these 
ideologies.  This is not to argue that most insurgent leaders are somehow hypocritical; there certainly are 
many (and probably the majority) who are ‘true believers.’  At the same time, however, the environment 
in which they are operating typically will cause shifts and modifications to the base ideology.  These shifts 
(if recognized by counterinsurgency forces) may have considerable significance in devising broader 
counterinsurgency and internal security strategies.
Complexity Theory & Armed Groups
Analysts in recent years have paid much more attention to network structures.  Clearly this has been a 
positive development overall, but groups’ interactions are more than networks.  A key question for 
analysts in dealing with environments in which more than one violent group is operating – which likely 
describes most countries in which there is significant instability – is how these interactions might change 
each group’s behavior.
This is more than a simple one-on-one relationship amenable to conventional network diagramming, 
although this is of course a starting point.  In many cases, ‘reverse’ links – groups in active opposition to 
each other – may in fact be much more important than cooperative relationships.  Each group has an 
impact on the security environment, and this is true regardless of whether they are directly linked.  
Complex environments lead to complex groups, and their interactions can even further add to problems in 
analysis.
Several analytical issues revolve around viewing the complexities of multiple armed groups of multiple 
types within a country or regions.  The first is identifying triggers and tipping points that might cause 
groups to either ally or split.  The second is determining whether splits and schisms are net positives or 
negatives for the security forces and the security environment. Finally, the interactions of multiple groups 
can make analysis very difficult.  Complexity is non-deterministic, and gives no way whatsoever to 
precisely predict the future.  At best, probable trends and ranges of probabilities can be expected from 
analysis of this environment.
A key point in dealing with such groups is that their activities can serve (and decidedly have served) as a 
catalyst for wider violence and unrest.  This can be exemplified by the activities of the Mungiki in Kenya:
"Initially, we were seeing three kinds of violence," says Muthoni Wanyeki, executive 
director of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission. Disorganized violence in villages tended 
to rise up suddenly, but fizzle out quickly. Organized militias – with paid, motivated 
members – have kept the violence going and have largely led the charge in expelling 
minority ethnic groups by force. Police use of extreme force – live bullets rather than water 
cannons or tear gas – has also stirred ethnic passions.  A fourth type of violence has now 
emerged, as displaced people carry back stories of horror and spur on calls of revenge in 
communities that had previously been peaceful. "Now we are seeing a communal response 
in areas where it has not happened before," says Ms. Wanyeki.
The Mungiki also raise one other issue:  “armed” groups do not have to be well armed to be significant.  
Any group with some level of organization – either formal or loosely networked – and motivation to use 
violence can shift internal security environments rather quickly.  Clearly, underlying stressors must exist, 
but if so, ill-armed (and perhaps poorly organized) groups can serve as a tipping point for widespread 
violence.  At times, this might lead to the virtual collapse of state control. 
Insurgency environments can bring many other security issues.  Phil Williams of the Ridgeway Center
has shown the impact of criminal activities on security in Iraq. In some cases, insurgents of various groups 
have engaged in organized crime; in other cases, criminal groups have cooperated with the insurgents; in 
yet others, gangs have operated along parallel tracks separate from the insurgency.  In all cases, organized 
crime has significantly complicated restoration of security.  Clearly, in some cases – most notably the 
Maras in Central America and arguably the drug gangs in Mexico – organized crime by itself can 
constitute a national security crisis.
A Paler Shade of Red
To some degree, some of these concerns of too great an emphasis on ‘pure’ insurgent – or in the military 
color scheme, ‘red’ – groups have become increasingly a matter of official recognition.  Most significant 
in recent years (at least within the US military) has been the Major General Flynn report on his 
experiences in Afghanistan. Although MG Flynn’s report very correctly identifies the need for intelligence 
collection on the ‘white’ components of a country facing an insurgency, it can leave out significant 
components of the overall security environment.  Continuing the color coding system of analysis, there 
likely are actors that can be represented as various shades of pink.  These are groups – in some cases, 
inchoate or very loosely organized – that can have a major impact on the course of internal security.  
Many of these groups may have few aspirations beyond either profit motive or in some cases simply 
providing localized security for their tribes or immediate areas, but they must be factored in to strategic 
analysis.
Strategy for Complex Environments
So where does this leave strategic planning for forces involved in these types of environments, whether 
the governments themselves or intervening forces or advisors?  There certainly are lessons to be drawn 
from earlier “imperial policing”, whether British or French colonial efforts or US involvement in places 
such as the Philippines or Central America.  C. E. Callwell, Frank Kitson, the US Marine Small Wars 
Manual, and various French authors certainly can be read with value.  At the same time, however, 
adopting their precepts wholesale is very unlikely to succeed in the age of the video cell phone and 
improved tools for networking and rapid communications.  Localized security threats are unlikely to 
remain localized, and they can become ‘viral.’ 
The major element for success is a broader understanding of the overall security environment and 
awareness that it probably is subject to continuing shifts.  Environmental sensing may be the most 
important tool in trying to track the trajectory of armed groups.  The term ‘environmental sensing’ is used 
quite deliberately.  A focus on ‘red’ and ‘white’ groups or ‘government controlled’ or ‘opposition 
controlled’ areas likely will inevitably lead to faulty analysis and consequent strategic failure.  Instead, the 
stress should be on varying levels of potential instability and the multiple groups (with multiple 
motivations) that can impact this.
The ‘government controlled-opposition controlled’ dichotomy also can lead to a false sense of progress.  It 
is all too easy to view areas in which there are no active insurgent groups or operations as being 
‘government controlled.’  Competing power centers and groups with no particular allegiance to either the 
government or the insurgents can also be key players.  As such, these areas may be as important to long-
term strategic goals as active insurgent areas.  This issue is closely connected with the fallacy of the term 
“ungoverned areas” which is common among analysts.  Where there are people, there will be some form 
of governance.  “Alternative governance” is a much more realistic concept.  The variety of groups that do 
not fit into the standard strategic templates certainly can provide their version of governance either at local 
or broader areas that must be factored into analysis of the operational environment.
The other aspect of environmental sensing is that intervention forces themselves become part of the 
environment.  Even if forces avoid the ‘us versus them’ syndrome, it is easy to overlook the ‘us and them’ 
reality.  By their very presence, intervention forces become enmeshed in the complexities of the local 
environment.  Analysis has tended to revolve around the effects of governmental or intervention force 
operations, with much less thought given to the impacts of the simple presence of these forces.  This is 
one reason why some tools such as Human Terrain Teams and other forms of cultural analysis of 
operational theaters have experienced problems:  they usually rely on historical patterns of what the 
society was like before the imposition of fresh actors.   The presence of intervention forces can (and 
usually does) change the dynamics of various power centers and armed groups of whatever stripe.  In a 
real sense, any network analysis of armed groups in an operational theater must include intervention 
forces as yet another actor.
The complexities within and among the various groups present (and emerging) in environments facing 
internal security threats almost certainly will continue to plague strategists, whether among the 
governments directly facing these threats or by intervention forces.  Unless analysts and planners broaden 
their focus to incorporate a broader picture of competing power centers to the government, long-term 
stability and success are very unlikely.  Successful strategy will rely on incorporating analysis both on 
interactions among a broader range of actors and their changes over time.
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